The Taoist Case Against Comparing Yourself to Others
Near the opening of the Zhuangzi, there is a passage about a mushroom that cannot know the alternation of morning and evening, and an insect that cannot know the alternation of spring and autumn. They are not stupid; they simply exist on a different timescale. Zhuangzi uses this image to make a point about comparison that is still, twenty-three centuries later, one of the strangest and most liberating ideas in philosophy.
Comparison is so woven into the texture of modern life that it barely registers as a choice. Social media has made it continuous and involuntary — we observe other people's lives, careers, relationships, bodies, and achievements in a stream with no natural end. The psychological literature on what this does to wellbeing is now substantial, and none of it is encouraging. Comparison, particularly upward social comparison, reliably produces dissatisfaction. We know this. We keep doing it anyway.
The typical response is some version of self-acceptance: try to be kinder to yourself, remember that you're seeing other people's highlights, focus on your own journey. This is not bad advice. But it remains entirely within the framework of comparison — it is a coping strategy for the pain comparison causes, not a challenge to the underlying assumption that the comparison was a reasonable thing to attempt in the first place.
Taoism takes a more radical position.
The mushroom and the tortoise
The mushroom of a morning knows not the alternation of day and night. The chrysalis knows not the alternation of spring and autumn. Theirs are short years.
— Zhuangzi, Chapter 1 (Herbert Giles translation)
Zhuangzi follows this with the image of Peng — a bird of enormous size that rises ninety thousand li into the sky and migrates from the northern darkness to the southern sea. The small cicada and the young dove laugh at it: "We fly up and alight on an elm tree, and when we cannot reach it, we throw ourselves down and alight on the ground. What is the use of going ninety thousand li in order to go to the south?" Zhuangzi's response is not to say that the cicada and the dove are wrong. He simply points out that their knowledge is not equal to the task of judging Peng. They have no access to the scale required to evaluate what a migration of that distance means or is for.
The point is not that Peng is better than the dove. It is that comparison between them is simply uninformative — they exist on different scales, have different natures, and are therefore incommensurable. To apply the dove's criteria to Peng is a category error, and the same applies the other way. The mushroom is not lesser than the tortoise who lives for eight hundred years; it simply has a different existence, lived at a different timescale, with a different relationship to what counts as a long or short life.
Incommensurability, not consolation
This is a different move from self-acceptance. Self-acceptance says: you may not measure up to the comparison, but that's okay, you're still worthwhile. The Taoist position says something more interesting: the comparison was never coherent in the first place. Not because everyone is equally good at everything, but because what it means to live well, to flourish, to succeed, is not the same for everyone — and cannot be, because each person, like each creature, has a different nature.
Ziran — the concept of naturalness or self-so-ness — is central here. Things are most fully themselves when they are expressing their own nature without interference or imitation. A fish that tries to climb a tree is not an ambitious fish; it is a fish with the wrong idea about what fish are for. The problem with comparison is not just that it makes us feel bad — it is that it consistently points us toward the wrong standard. We are measuring ourselves against a nature that is not ours.
This matters practically. When someone compares their career to a colleague's and feels they fall short, what is actually happening? They are applying someone else's criteria of success — someone else's scale, someone else's values, someone else's timescale — to their own life, which exists on different terms. The comparison feels meaningful because it uses numbers and categories that appear objective. But the mushroom and the tortoise can both be assessed by "years lived" and the number will mean something completely different for each.
What Taoism proposes instead
The alternative is not competition-avoidance or a retreat into self-isolation. It is the more demanding practice of actually understanding your own nature — what Zhuangzi elsewhere calls living by your inner nature rather than by the opinions of others. This is not easy, partly because other people's standards are so visible and our own so hard to discern, and partly because we have usually been shaped since childhood by frameworks that were designed for someone else's flourishing.
Pu — the uncarved block — points toward this. The uncarved block has not yet been shaped into something specific. It holds the potential to become many things. Excessive social comparison is one of the forces that carves us prematurely — that imposes a shape based on what other people's blocks have been carved into, rather than allowing the nature of our own block to emerge on its terms and timescale.
There is a practical question this raises: how do you know what your own nature is, if you have spent years measuring yourself against other people's? Zhuangzi does not give a simple answer, because there isn't one. But he suggests that stillness, observation, and a willingness to stop looking sideways are necessary conditions. The dove who stops watching Peng might, eventually, learn something about what a dove is actually for.